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        1 - A Response to an Old Problem about Mulla Sadra’s Encounter with Suhrawardi’s Arguments on Denying the Pre-Existence of the Soul
        Ali  Shirvani Mojtaba  Afsharpour
        There are some disagreements among philosophers on the pre-existence of the soul, that is, the existence of the soul before joining the body, whether it is originated or pre-eternal. Mulla Sadra maintains that the soul – the soul qua soul – originates in the trans-subst More
        There are some disagreements among philosophers on the pre-existence of the soul, that is, the existence of the soul before joining the body, whether it is originated or pre-eternal. Mulla Sadra maintains that the soul – the soul qua soul – originates in the trans-substantial motion of the body (corporeal origination) through particular individuation. However, he agrees with its pre-existence and considers it to be a rational one. When discussing this issue, he investigates, criticizes, and rejects Suhrawardi’s arguments on denying pre-existence. The commentators of Mulla Sadra’s words have always asked the question of why he did not agree with Suhrawardi’s arguments on denying the soul’s pre-existence based on his own particular individuation so that they would appear unanimous with respect to this problem. At least, this is what one could understand from Suhrawardi’s words and arguments. Accordingly, some of the early and contemporary commentators criticized him and believed that his objections to Suhrawardi’s words were unfounded. In this paper, while briefly referring to the fundamental principles of Suhrawardi’s arguments and Mulla Sadra’s related criticisms, the writers explain the main reason why Mulla Sadra refused to accept Suhrawardi’s view about the pre-existence of the soul. Manuscript profile
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        2 - A Study of Ḥakīm Khājūī’s Objections to the Gnostic Theory of Oneness of Being
        Mahmud  Seydi Mohammad Javad  Pashaei
        As the basis of theoretical gnosis, oneness of being has provoked several debates among thinkers in the history of Islamic philosophy. Mullā Ismā‘īl Khājūī, one of the thinkers and Mutikallimun of the Safavid period and post-Sadrian era, has criticized this theory and c More
        As the basis of theoretical gnosis, oneness of being has provoked several debates among thinkers in the history of Islamic philosophy. Mullā Ismā‘īl Khājūī, one of the thinkers and Mutikallimun of the Safavid period and post-Sadrian era, has criticized this theory and challenged it from different aspects. Khājūī rejects this theory based on the ontological differences between the Necessary Being and possible beings, absence of absoluteness in the Necessary Being, the lack of a rational argument for demonstrating the oneness of being, and the inefficiency of the arguments of some gnostics and mystics on proving this oneness. However, the present study postulates that Khājūī’s criticisms originate in confusing the different meanings of certain key terms in philosophical sciences and kalām with those in theoretical gnosis. Nevertheless, it seems that in certain cases, such as gnostics’ failure in adducing a rational argument for demonstrating the oneness of being, his criticism is justified. Manuscript profile
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        3 - Goodness of Justice: An Intellectual or Rational Theorem?
        Mohammad Imami حسین فرزانه
        “Justice is good” and “cruelty is bad” are two of the most frequently used principles and propositions in various disciplines. Mutikallimun consider these two propositions to be rational, primary necessary, evident, certain, and needless of reasoning. However, some phil More
        “Justice is good” and “cruelty is bad” are two of the most frequently used principles and propositions in various disciplines. Mutikallimun consider these two propositions to be rational, primary necessary, evident, certain, and needless of reasoning. However, some philosophers deny their evidence and certainty and consider them as generally accepted propositions that bear no truth except for conforming to thinkers’ views. Certainty in relation to these two propositions means believing in the correctness of their use in arguments and production of scientific results, and indemonstrability refers to their dialectical application. Some believe that the indemonstrability in the interpretation of such propositions would undermine the basis of moral propositions. The question here is why there is so much controversy about these two apparently evident propositions. The findings of this descriptive-analytic study reveal that the solution must be found in distinguishing between “intellectual goodness” and “rational goodness”. When these two propositions are considered as individual intellectual propositions, they are hypothetical and genetic judgments; however, at a rational social level, they are evident and, of course, mentally posited and, unlike the general view of logicians, they must be viewed as certain propositions (not as generally accepted ones). In addition, some statements such as “They have no basis but popularity”, which are used by some philosophers and logicians about the two propositions, are not used to deny their reality. Rather, they are intended to deny the evidence and necessity of these two propositions in intellectual analyses. Thus, no damage is done to their support for moral propositions. Manuscript profile
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        4 - An Analysis of the Ascension of the Holy Prophet (ṣ) of Islam Based on the Philosophical Principles of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā
        Maryam Samadieh Abdulrazzaq  Hessamifar
        In the view of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā, the Prophet’s ascension was an indisputable truth, and those who deny it are among unbelievers and deviators from the right path. Ibn Sīnā believes that the Prophet’s ascension was not corporeal because the body cannot traverse a More
        In the view of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā, the Prophet’s ascension was an indisputable truth, and those who deny it are among unbelievers and deviators from the right path. Ibn Sīnā believes that the Prophet’s ascension was not corporeal because the body cannot traverse a very long distance in a moment. Thus, it was intellectual and spiritual. In other words, as the route of the Prophet’s ascension passed through immaterial worlds, one cannot consider this journey a corporeal one. However, Mullā Ṣadrā explicitly speaks of the corporeal quality of the Prophet’s presence in ascension. He believes in the corporeal presence of the Prophet (ṣ) in his heavenly journey as well as the corporeal nature of what happened to him in the night of ascension. Nevertheless, their corporeality is in proportion to the worlds in which the Prophet (ṣ) travelled. Mullā Ṣadrā considers three types of body for human beings: rational, Ideal, and elemental. He maintains that earthly journey is of the elemental type, and heavenly journey is of the Ideal and rational types. He also believes that the Prophet (ṣ) wore the corporeal attire in conformity with the worlds to and through which he travelled. This paper investigates and analyzes the quality of the Prophet’s presence in the night of ascension and the otherworldly things that happened to him during that night following a descriptive-analytic approach and based on the views of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā. Manuscript profile